Review: Reviews of Books

Reviewed Work(s): Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and after Ali M. Ansari

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The failure of the Young Turks to promote their ideology of Ottomanism, trying to create a pan-Ottoman patriotism as an alternative to the nationalist movements challenging Ottoman rule in the Balkans, is well captured in a response of the Bulgarian newspaper Der (Sofia) in January 1910 to an article published by the Young Turkish paper İkadım. The latter claimed that the different ethnic groups in Macedonia, despite the restoration of constitutional rule in the Ottoman Empire by the Young Turks in 1908, had not given up their separatist agendas and were, in fact, using the freedoms granted by the constitution to advance their own nationalist goals. The Bulgarian paper replied that the very concept of an “Ottoman nation” was an illusion, that the ideology of Ottomanism demanded of the various groups living under Ottoman rule to renounce their own national identities, and that the constitutional revolution of 1908 could not obliterate the facts of national difference (p. 360).

This exchange illustrates the impossibility of reaching an understanding on the so-called “Macedonian question” between the Young Turks and their Ottomanist ideology, on the one hand, and the various national groups—Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbians, Albanians—living in Macedonia, on the other hand. As Mehmet Hacsalihoglu suggests in his study of the Young Turks and their relations with the various parties involved in the fight over Macedonia, a region including the three Ottoman provinces of Salonika, Monastir, and Skopje, the imperial idea of Ottomanism and the goal of national self-determination in an ethnically based nation-state were simply too incompatible to create a meaningful dialogue between the different sides.

In his study, Hacsalihoglu positions himself primarily vis-à-vis the historiography of the successor states of the Ottoman Empire, such as in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. He shows an impressive command of sources in various languages, particularly of Bulgarian archival and published sources and of Ottoman sources representing the views of the Young Turk leaders. He concludes that it was the incompatibility of the Young Turks’ Ottomanist ideology and the separatist Balkan nationalisms that made coexistence within a constitutional Ottoman framework impossible. He argues that the nationalist agenda of the new Balkan nation-states (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia) with their own competing interests in Macedonia was an even more important factor in the failure of the policy of Ottomanism than the growing intolerance of the Young Turk regime itself. Taking issue with a claim often found in the national historiographies of the Balkan states, Hacsalihoglu discusses the question whether the Young Turks tried to “Turkify” Macedonia by force and whether their Ottomanism may have been more of a Muslim-Turkish nationalism than a unifying ideology. He concludes that until the beginning of the first Balkan War in 1912, one cannot really speak of a strong Turkish nationalism or Pan-Turkish among the Young Turks, and he argues that there is little evidence to suggest that there was a systematic politics of “Turkification” in Macedonia.

Hacsalihoglu’s work provides a starting point for future research. Yet, his study remains quite unsatisfying for its lack of any engagement with the vast theoretical literature on nationalism. While this new study provides a plethora of detail in its description of the interaction between the Young Turk leadership and various national groups in Macedonia, it fails to examine the ideologies and constructions of community and identity on the various sides of the conflict in any systematic way. Given the wealth of the material presented, a coherent analytical framework that grounded the study in debates about nationalism, ethnicity, and empire could have led to a much more compelling result.

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$28.00.

Iran’s turbulent and dynamic twentieth-century history has made it a subject of interest to historians and other fields of social science and humanities. Beside its two revolutions, Iran’s attempts to modernize under the Pahlavi shahs, its oil nationalization movement under Mohammad Mosaddeq, its Islamic movement under the Shi’a clergy, and its leftist/communist movement have had a profound influence on the Middle East. Ali M. Ansari’s book is a brave, if concise attempt to provide a history of Iran during the twentieth century and beyond. It is based on mostly secondary sources but also includes some archival and other primary research. The author’s starting point is 1921, when a
military coup put Cossack Colonel Reza Khan (Pahlavi) on his path to become king and to attempt to modernize Iranian society from above. Ansari provides a background of events leading to the 1921 coup that may stand as a brief analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909 (chapter one).

The author then attempts to explain and analyze the rule of Reza Shah (chapters two and three). Neither here nor in the following chapter four, covering the period from 1941 to the coup of 1953, is there any groundbreaking analysis. Perhaps the only new element that distinguishes Ansari’s approach to this period from others is his emphasis on the fact that, after his overthrow, Mosaddeq gained a somewhat mythical standing in Iranian politics (pp. 129–31).

Chapters five to seven are a summary of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s reign from 1953 to the 1979 Revolution. Here again, the author presents his readers not with any new analysis but rather with a focused synopsis of the period leading up to the revolution. Coverage of the radical guerrilla movements during this period is minimal and certainly deserved more attention, as they contributed to the resistance to the shah’s dictatorial rule.

The book’s strength is Ansari’s methodical attempt to dispel pro-monarchy myths put forward by some Iranians (including the shah himself) to portray the revolution as an attempt by the United States and Britain to undermine their former ruler. By going through the shah’s reign step by step, the author once more shows how the shah’s own mismanagement and the despotic nature of his rule, not any plot by foreigners, were the cause of his regime’s demise. Another strong point of the book is Ansari’s provision of context, chronology, and analysis for the thirteen months of revolutionary upheaval that culminated in the toppling of the shah’s regime.

Some historians will disagree with aspects of the author’s analysis regarding the fate of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, whose collapse is still a subject of discussion. The shah had spent a good portion of Iran’s wealth on the armed forces, and they were expected to be the pillar of the regime’s stability; instead they proved incapable of saving it. Ansari’s explanation of why this happened focuses entirely on the facts that, once the shah was out of the picture, the army was incapable of acting independently (p. 209). This is certainly part of the reason why the army collapsed as quickly as it did, but perhaps not all. The book’s bibliography does not include memoirs and other documentary sources related to key players involved with the army during the last months of the Pahlavi regime. These include the memoirs of Gen. Abbas Qarabazi (the shah’s last joint chief of staff) and Gen. Robert Huyser, the deputy NATO commander sent to Iran to assess the condition of the military. According to these and other sources, Iran’s Imperial Armed Forces (seventy-five percent of whose personnel were temporary draftees) was losing men to desertion at an accelerated rate. This factor should at least have been considered by the author.

Finally, chapters eight and nine cover the postrevolutionary period only very broadly. Perhaps a pause and an in-depth study of the first two years of the revolution would have been a better and more practical manner of closing the book.

Ansari’s work should not be considered a detailed analytical study of Iran in the twentieth century but rather an overview of a turbulent century in Iran’s long history. As such, the book should be welcomed and will appeal to those who wish to read a concise version of Iran’s twentieth-century history. It could also be used as a text for any undergraduate Middle Eastern history course.

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Toby Dodge correctly depicts Iraq as a failed state arising from failed British policies and administrations early in the twentieth century. Dodge is not so much a historian of Iraq and the modern Middle East as he is a political sociologist concerned with what he calls “the birth and evolution of the postcolonial state in the international system” (p. 249). Dodge’s eleven-page preface offers some observations on U.S. intervention in contemporary Iraq, and his fourteen-page conclusion speculates on Iraq’s future. While the audience for such commentary is wide, the usefulness of such views is limited. Therefore, the value of the book lies in how much the remaining 150 pages help us to understand what the British did and did not do in Iraq from 1914 to 1932.

Dodge’s chapter on the British use of the so-called Mandate System contributes little to our understanding of the period from 1917 to 1922, when mandates became a convenient way of avoiding the stigma of imperialism. Within less than two years, the ambitious postwar schemes and costly military operations devised by British administrators and officers in Iraq began to give way to London’s determination to cut the huge military costs there. From 1923 to 1932, the British ran Iraq on the cheap by relying on Sunni, Hashemite, military, and minority collaborators; by insisting that Iraq pay its own way; and by keeping the British profile in Iraq as low as possible. The British secured their dominance in Iraq by using airplanes for intelligence and police work, with Winston Churchill setting the precedent as colonial secretary by ordering rebellious tribes to be bombed from the air. Later his successor, Leopold Amery, justified British imperial paramountcy in Iraq on the grounds of aviation as well as oil.

Dodge devotes three chapters to showing how little the British knew about the region and peoples they dominated technologically and militarily. Most offi-