Jean Pierre P Langlois

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Jean Pierre P Langlois

( He/Him/His )

Emeritus Faculty/Instructional Faculty
Mathematics

Phone Number:
Location:

At SF State Since:

1983

Office Hours:

Bio:

Jean-Pierre Langlois is a native of France and a United States citizen. He received his Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1983.

Online Game Theory

Jean-Pierre Langlois often taught Game Theory at SFSU.

The latest version of the course, called Math 491, was given online.

Below is a full set of video lectures, homework and case studies that asked the students to construct game theoretic models, as well as the lecture notes. All can be viewed or downloaded.

The course uses the GamePlan software available under the Software tab on this page..

Introduction

Lecture 1

Lecture 2 

Lecture 3  Homework

Lecture 4

Lecture 5  Homework

Lecture 6

Lecture 7

Lecture 8

Lecture 9 

Case Study 1: Text  Video

Case Study 2: Text  Video

Case Studies: Dept Fight  Tenure  Traffic 

Test #1: Trust

Lecture 10

Lecture 11  Homework

Lecture 12

Lecture 13

Lecture 14

Case Studies:  Neighborhood  Blight  More Neighbor

Test #2: Treaty

Lecture 15

Lecture 16

Homework

Case Study: Nuclear Crisis 

Final Exam

Lecture Notes:

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

GamePlan

This page is devoted to the GamePlan software.

GamePlan is a Windows-based application. You must have Windows installed or accessible on your device to use it. The installer is downloadable using this link:

GP4Setup

You can access a video below that explains how to use the software. It is about one hour long:

GamePlanVideo

GamePlan was primarily designed to handle all basic forms (normal and extensive, with or without perfect information) but, most importantly to allow repeated play. This can be done in many ways within the GamePlan framework: one can simply design a game on a graph rather than on a tree. Since loops are allowed (with discounting) the game can potentially go on forever. An important variation is to define a normal form game and allow it to repeat while defining various "states" of the game that summarize the past. For instance, the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma can have two states (always cooperated, at least one defect). The "Grim Trigger" will arise as a SPE (subgame perfect equilibrium) as well as "Always Defect". But one can define more states and represent Tit-for-Tat, Contrite Tit-for-Tat, and so on. To learn how to use GamePlan, you may consult Chapter 2 of my lecture notes accessible by this link:

User's Guide

Research

Jean-Pierre Langlois' research area is game theory with a focus on discounted repeated
games and applications to international conflict and cooperation.

The following selected papers are typical:

"Rational Deterrence by Proxy: Designing Cooperative Security Agreement" (with Catherine Langlois). Defence & Peace Economics, 2017.

"Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty, and the Failure of Bargaining" (with Catherine Langlois). British Journal of Political Science, 2012.

"The Escalation of Terror: Hate and the Demise of Terrorist Organizations" (with Catherine Langlois). Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2011.

"Costly Interference: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Sanctions" (with Catherine Langlois). Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16, 2010.

"Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis" (with Catherine Langlois). International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, 2009.

"Dispute Settlement Design for Unequal Partners: A Game Theoretic Approach" (with Catherine Langlois) 2007, International Interactions, Vol. 33, Issue 4, pp. 347-382.

"When Fully Informed States Make Good on the Threat of War: Rational Escalation and the Failure of Bargaining" (with Catherine Langlois). British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, 2006, pp. 645-669.

"Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements" (with Catherine Langlois). International Interaction, Vol. 32, 2006, pp.261-293.

"Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence: Trading off the Risk of War for the Promise of a Better Deal" (with Catherine Langlois). Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 23, 2006, pp.159-180.

"Fully Informed and On the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence" (with Catherine Langlois). International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, 2005, pp.503-527.

"Provisions for Noncompliance and Treaty Value: A Game Theoretic Perspective" (with Catherine Langlois). International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, 2004, pp.383-408.

"Engineering Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Phased International Agreements" (with Catherine Langlois), American Journal of Political Science, Vol 45 #3, July 2001, pp. 599-219.

"Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction: A Game Theoretic Analysis" (with Catherine langlois), Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, #5, October 1999.

"Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction: An Empirical Appraisal" (with Catherine langlois), Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, #6, December 1999.

"Rationality in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of the U.S.-China Case" (with Catherine Langlois, World Politics, Vol. 48 #3, April 1996, pp. 358-90.

"Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35 #4, November 1991, pp. 801-32.

"Tacit Bargaining in International Relations: A Game Model and a Case Study" (with Catherine Langlois, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40 #4, December 1996, pp. 567-96.

"Existence and Local Stability of Pareto Superior Reaction Function Equilibria in Discounted Supergames" (with Jonathan Sachs) Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 22 #3, 1993, pp. 199-222.

"Modeling Deterrence and International Crises" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33 #1, March 1989, pp. 67-83.

"Perfect Equilibria and Stable Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 11 #2, 1991, pp. 69-98.