Research

Jean-Pierre Langlois' research area is game theory with a focus on discounted repeated
games and applications to international conflict and cooperation.

The following selected papers are typical:

"Rational Deterrence by Proxy: Designing Cooperative Security Agreement" (with Catherine Langlois). Defence & Peace Economics, 2017.

"Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty, and the Failure of Bargaining" (with Catherine Langlois). British Journal of Political Science, 2012.

"The Escalation of Terror: Hate and the Demise of Terrorist Organizations" (with Catherine Langlois). Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2011.

"Costly Interference: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Sanctions" (with Catherine Langlois). Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16, 2010.

"Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis" (with Catherine Langlois). International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, 2009.

"Dispute Settlement Design for Unequal Partners: A Game Theoretic Approach" (with Catherine Langlois) 2007, International Interactions, Vol. 33, Issue 4, pp. 347-382.

"When Fully Informed States Make Good on the Threat of War: Rational Escalation and the Failure of Bargaining" (with Catherine Langlois). British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, 2006, pp. 645-669.

"Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements" (with Catherine Langlois). International Interaction, Vol. 32, 2006, pp.261-293.

"Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence: Trading off the Risk of War for the Promise of a Better Deal" (with Catherine Langlois). Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 23, 2006, pp.159-180.

"Fully Informed and On the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence" (with Catherine Langlois). International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, 2005, pp.503-527.

"Provisions for Noncompliance and Treaty Value: A Game Theoretic Perspective" (with Catherine Langlois). International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, 2004, pp.383-408.

"Engineering Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Phased International Agreements" (with Catherine Langlois), American Journal of Political Science, Vol 45 #3, July 2001, pp. 599-219.

"Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction: A Game Theoretic Analysis" (with Catherine langlois), Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, #5, October 1999.

"Behavioral Issues of Rationality in International Interaction: An Empirical Appraisal" (with Catherine langlois), Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, #6, December 1999.

"Rationality in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of the U.S.-China Case" (with Catherine Langlois, World Politics, Vol. 48 #3, April 1996, pp. 358-90.

"Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35 #4, November 1991, pp. 801-32.

"Tacit Bargaining in International Relations: A Game Model and a Case Study" (with Catherine Langlois, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40 #4, December 1996, pp. 567-96.

"Existence and Local Stability of Pareto Superior Reaction Function Equilibria in Discounted Supergames" (with Jonathan Sachs) Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 22 #3, 1993, pp. 199-222.

"Modeling Deterrence and International Crises" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33 #1, March 1989, pp. 67-83.

"Perfect Equilibria and Stable Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 11 #2, 1991, pp. 69-98.